Communication
3628/2019
Submission: 2019.05.29
View Adopted: 2024.10.31
In October 2024, the Committee issued three landmark Views in Susana v. Nicaragua, Lucía v. Nicaragua, and Norma v. Ecuador, addressing adolescent pregnancy from sexual violence and the denial of access to abortion and related services.
In Norma v. Ecuador, where therapeutic abortion was legally permissible under certain conditions, the Committee found that the State’s failure to provide accessible services, among other systemic shortcomings, resulted in findings of gender-based violence and intersectional discrimination. Consistently, the Committee affirmed in all three Views that denying women-specific health services, including reproductive health, is a form of gender-based violence against women and girls, aligning its stance with other UN treaty bodies.1 Notably, the protection of reproductive autonomy under article 17 (privacy) was not only reaffirmed but extended in Norma to include interference with a woman’s decision to place her child for adoption in situations of forced pregnancy.
These Views strongly underscore the State’s positive obligations to prevent violence, protect victims, provide adequate healthcare, and ensure effective investigations and remedies. This is reflected in the Committee’s extensive recommendations for systemic reforms, urging legislative amendments for abortion access, decisive actions against gender-specific violence, and specialized training for relevant personnel. Collectively, these decisions significantly advance the jurisprudence on reproductive rights, discrimination, and States’ duties to protect young women under the Covenant.
The author is a 13-year-old Ecuadorian girl who was repeatedly raped by her father, resulting in pregnancy. She had previously been removed from his custody due to allegations of sexual abuse against another child, but was later returned to his care, where the abuse continued. Unaware of her pregnancy due to a lack of sex education, she only discovered her condition at 27 weeks. Seeking an abortion, she was told it was too late, leading to severe psychological distress, including suicidal thoughts. During her pregnancy and childbirth, the author indicates that she received inadequate support, information, or alternatives from the healthcare system. Some medical staff allegedly treated her with hostility, exerted pressure for a cesarean section, and encouraged bonding with the child despite her expressed wish to pursue adoption. She reports receiving only minimal psychological counselling and navigating motherhood largely without assistance. Additionally, the author states that the justice system did not offer timely protection and delayed investigations into the reported sexual abuse. The authorities did not arrest the accused despite DNA evidence confirming his paternity, and the author was never informed about the closure of her case. Forced into early motherhood, she struggled with economic hardship, had limited education opportunities, and was denied government support, exacerbating her vulnerability and long-term suffering.
The author claims that the State party’s actions and omissions in regard to the criminal proceedings and the forced maternity violated her rights under article 2 (3) read in conjunction with articles 3, 6, 7, 9, 17, 19, 24 (1) and 26 of the Covenant.
The Committee found the communication admissible, rejecting the State party’s argument that domestic remedies had not been exhausted, as no timely or effective legal avenue for abortion was available. Specifically, the Committee noted the author’s argument that the acción de protección (protection action) was not de facto available to her and would not have been effective or expeditious enough for an abortion, a point the State party failed to sufficiently rebut with evidence of its effectiveness in similar, timely cases. It also dismissed claims that access to reproductive health services fell outside the Covenant’s scope, affirming that the case involved multiple protected rights, as the lack of access to such services can impair the enjoyment of rights explicitly guaranteed by the Covenant. While the claim under article 9 (1) was deemed insufficiently substantiated, the allegations under articles 6, 7, 17, and 19, read alone and in conjunction with articles 2 (3), 3, 24 (1) and 26, were considered sufficiently substantiated, allowing the case to proceed on the merits.
The Committee first addressed article 6 (1) (right to life), read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (3) (right to an effective remedy), and article 24 (1) (special protection for children). It recalled that the right to life cannot be understood restrictively and demands positive measures from States to protect it. The Committee considered that the State party’s initial failure to protect the author from foreseeable sexual violence by her father, given his known history and her prior placement under State protection (INNF), allowed the violations to commence and persist. Subsequently, once the author became pregnant as a result of this preventable rape, her expressed desire to terminate the pregnancy was ignored.
The Committee noted that article 150 of Ecuador’s Comprehensive Organic Penal Code (COIP) at the time recognized that a pregnancy could be legally interrupted if it posed a risk to the life or health of the pregnant person. Medical experts and indeed the State party itself (through its 2018 law recognizing pregnancies in under-15s as high risk) acknowledged that pregnancy and childbirth at age 13 constitute a significant risk of maternal mortality. Despite this, the State party took no effective measures to make this legal provision practically applicable to the author’s case. The Committee reiterated that States must provide safe, legal, and effective access to abortion when the life and health of the pregnant woman or girl are endangered, or when carrying the pregnancy to term would cause considerable pain or suffering, especially if the pregnancy is a consequence of rape or incest, and must eliminate existing obstacles to such access.
Furthermore, recalling its General Comment No. 36, the Committee emphasized that the right to life includes the right to enjoy a life with dignity. The forced continuation of the pregnancy, the denial of access to abortion, and the subsequent lack of support severely impacted the author’s life project and her right to a life with dignity. The State party did not dispute that the author had to abandon her education due to the rapes and her imposed maternal role, nor that she was forced into precarious, unskilled labor as an adolescent to support her child, or that she was denied a human development bonus to which she was entitled. These omissions and failures constituted a violation of article 6 (1), read alone and in conjunction with articles 2 (3), and 24 (1).
The Committee then found a violation of article 7 (prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment), read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (3), and article 24 (1). The Committee considered that the author suffered a high level of anguish from a combination of acts and omissions attributable to the State party. This included the State’s failure in its duty to protect her from foreseeable rape; the severe suffering caused by the sexual violence and the resulting forced pregnancy, which led to suicidal thoughts; the denial of access to a legally permissible abortion, forcing a child to carry a pregnancy to term; the revictimization by health and police officials; the lack of an effective criminal investigation depriving her of reparation; and the absence of necessary and adapted comprehensive care, including adequate psychological support, despite official acknowledgment of her need for long-term specialized attention. The Committee recalled that article 7 protects against moral suffering, a protection particularly crucial for minors. It referenced the jurisprudence of the CRC and the State party’s own Constitutional Court, which recognized that denying abortion access in cases of rape can constitute torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The fact that the aggressor was her father, a person in a position of authority, aggravated the trauma. The State’s failure to ensure timely psychological support, focusing instead on a “mother-child bond” against her will, and the de facto impunity for the aggressor due to investigative failures, further compounded her suffering in violation of article 7.
A violation of article 17 (right to privacy), read alone and in conjunction with article 24 (1), was also established. The Committee reiterated its jurisprudence that a woman’s decision to seek an abortion is a matter of private life. It explicitly extended this protection to encompass the obstruction of a girl’s or woman’s decision to give a child up for adoption when she has been forced to carry a pregnancy to term. The State party’s refusal to act in accordance with the author’s decision to end her pregnancy, particularly when domestic law (article 150 COIP) appeared to permit abortion in her specific circumstances (risk to health for a 13-year-old), and its subsequent denial of her wish to give her child up for intra-family adoption, constituted an arbitrary interference with her privacy rights.
The Committee further found a violation of article 19 (right to information), read alone and in conjunction with article 2 (3), and article 24 (1). The author was denied essential information at multiple stages: she lacked sexual education to identify the violence or her pregnancy sooner; she was not informed of her right to a therapeutic abortion under existing law; she received misleading information about her right to give her child for adoption to a relative (which was permissible under the Code for Children and Adolescents); and she was not informed about the contraceptive implant placed without her consent. Recalling that article 19 includes the right to receive quality, evidence-based sexual and reproductive health information, the Committee concluded that this lack of information prevented her from making informed decisions and directly contributed to her forced pregnancy and motherhood.
Finally, the Committee addressed the violations of articles 3 (equality of men and women) and 26 (non-discrimination), read in conjunction with the other violated articles. The derogatory comments by authorities and the refusal to provide legally available reproductive health services reflected discriminatory treatment and gender-based stereotyping of the author’s reproductive role. The Committee observed that both the sexual violence itself and the lack of access to specific health services for women constitute forms of gender-based violence and discrimination. Thus, the facts of the case demonstrated a form of intersectional discrimination based on the author’s gender and age.
Given these extensive and interconnected violations, the Committee concluded that the State party had also breached its overarching obligation to ensure an effective remedy under article 2 (3), read in conjunction with all the aforementioned violated substantive rights (articles 3, 6, 7, 17, 19, 24 (1), and 26).
The State party should:
Deadline for implementation: 31 April 2025
More information:
— Centre for Reproductive Rights - UN Ruling: Ecuador and Nicaragua Must Legalize Abortion to End Violations of Girls’ Human Rights
— Ms. Magazine - U.N. Landmark Ruling Condemns Ecuador and Nicaragua for Forcing Girls Into Motherhood
— Planned Parenthood Press Statement - United Nations Human Rights Committee Issues Historic Ruling to Protect Girls from Forced Motherhood, Setting Global Precedent across 170+ Countries
