Communication
3011/2018
Submission: 2017.07.24
View Adopted: 2024.03.18
The author, A.K., submitted the communication on behalf of his brother, Mohamed Nabeel, a Maldivian national sentenced to death for murder. Nabeel was arrested in March 2009, and during a police interrogation on 8 April 2009, he provided a self-incriminating statement without legal representation, which he later retracted at trial, claiming he had signed it out of fear. Despite this, the statement was used to convict him and he was sentenced to death on 22 November 2010 by the Criminal Court. His appeals to the High Court (2015) and Supreme Court (2016) were dismissed. The author claims that Nabeel’s trial was unfair, as he was denied legal representation during the police investigation, and his sister’s testimony, which she later retracted, was also used as evidence. Additionally, since a 2014 regulation removed the President’s power to grant clemency, the right to seek pardon or commutation was transferred to the victim’s family, making it effectively unattainable. On 24 July 2017, the Committee requested interim measures to halt Nabeel’s execution while it reviewed the case. The State party argued that the trial adhered to domestic law, that Nabeel had declined legal representation at the police stage, and that his confession was freely given. It also cited a de facto moratorium on the death penalty since 1954, but did not rule out future executions.
In the present communication, the author alleges violations of articles 6 (1) and (4), read alone and with article 14, and article 7 of the Covenant, arguing that Nabeel’s death sentence resulted from an unfair trial and that his prolonged uncertainty on death row constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
The Committee declared the communication admissible under articles 6 (1) and (4), read alone and with article 14 (3) (d) and (g); but dismissed claims under article 7 as insufficiently substantiated, finding no evidence of specific mistreatment or psychological harm from execution threats. It also rejected the article 14 (3) (b) claim, noting that neither Nabeel nor his counsel requested more time for defence preparation, and extensions were granted when needed. The Committee admitted the claims under article 14 (3) (d) and (g), as Nabeel lacked legal representation for over eight months, including during his self-incriminating statement.
The Committee found violations of articles 6 (1) and (4), read alone and in conjunction with article 14 (3) (d) and (g). It concluded that Nabeel’s rights under article 14 (3) (g) were violated, as no investigation was conducted into his claim that his confession was made under duress, and the burden of proving voluntariness was wrongly placed on him rather than on the State. It also found a violation of article 14 (3) (d), as effective legal representation is essential in capital cases, and Nabeel should not have been interrogated without a lawyer, particularly given his later retraction of the statement at trial. The Committee held that these fair trial violations rendered his death sentence arbitrary, violating article 6 (1). It further found that the mandatory death penalty for intentional murder under the 2014 regulation was inconsistent with the Covenant, as it is settled that sentencing courts must consider individual circumstances before imposing capital punishment. This too was deemed violative of article 6 (1). Regarding article 6 (4), the Committee noted that within the guarantees of the provision, all death row prisoners must have a real opportunity to seek pardon or commutation, and such decisions should not be arbitrarily influenced by private individuals. Here, then, the transfer of clemency decisions from the executive to the victim’s family violated international standards, and the article.
The State party should:
Deadline for implementation: 18 September 2024
