Homeschooling of child on the philosophical and pedagogical convictions of parents

Facts

The authors are dual nationals of Sweden and the United States of America and submit the complaint on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor daughter, C.P., who is also a dual citizen. Owing to excellent academic performance of C.P. due to home-schooling for around 3 months and resultantly being promoted to studying with older children, the authors requested permission from the municipal Child and Education Board to homeschool C.P. Though the law mandates that children of school age must regularly attend school, the law also provides for alternative schooling in certain circumstances.

The authors claimed that the public education was not sufficient to meet the requirements of their daughter, and given their philosophical and pedagogical convictions, homeschooling would be better suited to meet her educational needs, especially given their daughter’s bilingualism and fluency in English. The Child and Education Board rejected this request on the reasoning that permission for alternative education could only be granted if it can be seen as an adequate alternative and only when transparency was met and there was an exceptional circumstance.

The authors claim that this has forced them to leave the country in order to homeschool their children in accordance with their convictions. The authors claim in the communication that their right to privacy without any unlawful interference, respect for religion, freedom of belief of one’s choice, right of parents to ensure religious and moral education of their children in conformity of their convictions, and non-discrimination on the basis of any political or other opinion have been violated under articles 2 (1), 17, 18 (1), (3) and (4), 26 and 27 of the Covenant.

Admissibility

The Committee held that the provision under article 2 of the Covenant under which the authors made a claim, and that it cannot give rise to a separate claim under the Optional Protocol as they lay down general obligations for State parties and hence the same would be inadmissible ratione materiae under article 3 of the Optional Protocol.

The Committee also held that the authors had failed to substantiate that the rejection of homeschooling had impacted their privacy and family under article 2. With respect to the authors’ claims under article 18, the Committee was of the opinion that the Covenant does not guarantee everyone’s right to education as such. The Committee noted that the authors left the State party and relocated to the US on the final decision regarding their request, and that the State party’s decision did not hinder the parents to simultaneously impart education to their children in line with their own values. This was considered as amounting to the authors challenging the general applicable legal framework and that the claim does not strictly fall under article 18 (1) of the Covenant as the authors did not sufficiently substantiate that integrated education would qualify as a manifestation of ‘religion’ or ‘belief’.

The Committee held that the authors had not sufficiently substantiated that the decision of the domestic authorities was clearly arbitrary or amounted to denial of justice. The Committee also held that with regard to the claims of the authors under articles 26 and 27 regarding non-discrimination and practice of culture, State parties have a margin of appreciation in assessing when similar situations justify different treatment, and the authors in the communication had not substantiated that the domestic authorities’ decision was discriminatory. For these reasons the Committee considered the present communication as inadmissible under articles 2 and 3 of the Optional Protocol.