Communication
2972/2017
Submission: 2015.02.11
View Adopted: 2023.07.19
M.C.Z., an Argentine national, was convicted in 2005 for the aggravated homicide of her husband and sentenced to 12 years in prison, exceeding the prosecution’s recommendation. The author claims violations of her rights under article 14 of the Covenant, arguing the court exceeded its authority by imposing a harsher sentence than requested by the prosecution, thereby acting inquisitorially contrary to the adversarial system prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure of Buenos Aires. Her appeals, including to the Supreme Court of the Province of Buenos Aires and ultimately to the Supreme Court of Argentina, were dismissed. M.C.Z. contends her constitutional rights to due process, impartial trial, and defence were violated, along with the pro homine principle, which advocates for the most favourable interpretation of the law for the individual.
M.C.Z. claims Argentina violated her rights under article 14 of the Covenant during her homicide trial. She argues the court was biased, as shown by sentencing her to a term longer than the prosecution recommended, without prior indication. This action, she asserts, breached her rights to an impartial trial, timely information on charges, and adequate defence preparation, as referred in articles 14 (1), 14 (3) (a), and (b). She also notes a legal inconsistency with Act No. 27.063, which restricts federal judges from exceeding the prosecution’s sentencing request, a principle she believes should extend to her case. Finally, she contends the surprise sentence length violated her right to appellate review under article 14 (5), as it was not contested in the original trial or charges.
The Committee noted that the amendment concerning procedural law only took effect in 2014 when it was enacted. It further clarified that this amendment, which pertains to the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure and not to the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Province of Buenos Aires, is not applicable to the author’s case. Therefore, the amendment does not demonstrate that the provisions of the local procedural code affecting the author’s case are in violation of article 14 (1) of the Covenant and that her claims under articles 14 (3) (a) and (b) about being informed of charges and preparing a defence were not substantiated, given the indictment remained unchanged and she was aware of the charges. Regarding article 14 (5), the Committee found her right to appellate review was not violated, as the appellate court reviewed her conviction and sentence in detail. Consequently, the Committee declared M.C.Z.’s communication inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol, stating it does not re-evaluate national court decisions or interpret domestic law. The communication is therefore not admissible.