Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in case of unlawful search and detention

Facts

The author is a Lithuanian national who worked as a director of a company named UAB Tauvita. The company was suspected of buying stolen cars, and as a result, the authorities procured a search warrant for the premises of the author’s property. During the search, the police officers mistakenly extended the search of the premises which was not covered by the warrant – specifically the outside kitchen from where they recovered a computer belonging to the author. Thereafter, the author was detained from the 18th to the 31st of October 2012. During his detention, the author was kept in a small cell which he shared with three other inmates in inhumane conditions and later he was shifted to another cell which was shared by eight other inmates, and he was also denied conjugal rights. He claimed that during an interrogation, he was forced to refuse legal representation by the authorities which he agreed to under duress and provided self-incriminating evidence. He also claimed that there were five other witnesses present during the search which the courts refused to consider. In 2015, the district court found the author not guilty and set aside all the charges however on appeal this decision was overturned, and the author was convicted and found guilty of buying a stolen car and selling the parts of Audi cars without entering the profit into the official records. The author’s first and second cassation appeal to the Supreme Court of Lithuania was found inadmissible.

The author filed the present communication alleging the violation of his rights under articles 7, 10 (1), 14 (1) (3) (d), (e) and (g) and 17 (1) of the Covenant on the grounds that he was kept in inhumane conditions during his detention, the search was conducted in areas outside the scope of the warrant, he was forced to refuse legal representation, the courts refused to consider five additional witnesses and that he was lured into providing self-incriminating evidence.

Admissibility

The Committee while noting the extensive information provided by the State party, listing available domestic remedies in accordance with national legislations held that the author neither raised the conditions of his detention with the national authorities nor requested any conjugal visits and therefore it is precluded from examining the author’s claims under articles 7 and 10 (1) for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, as required by article 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol. Further, the Committee also noted that the author did not complain about the location of the search before the domestic courts and also failed to explain how the State party acted unreasonably and arbitrarily. In light of this, the Committee found that the claim under articles 14 (1) and 17 (1) was inadmissible due to non-substantiation. With respect to the claim of the author being forced to refuse legal representation and inhumane treatment, the Committee noted that there were no circumstances to prove that the author was unable to defend himself without the assistance of counsel, nor that the investigating officers put pressure on him to reject the presence of his lawyer. In addition, the Committee also notes the author’s claim that the purpose of his inhuman detention was to extract a self-accusation; however, as the State party notes, there is a protocol whereby the author confirmed that the waiver was of his initiative, and he never complained at the domestic level about the conditions of his detention. The Committee therefore considers the claims raised by the author under article 14 (3) (d) inadmissible, under articles 2 and 5 (2) (b) of the Optional Protocol, for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Finally, regarding the claims concerning the evaluation of the facts and evidence by the domestic courts, the Committee was of the view that it does not review the same unless it can be ascertained that the evaluation was arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice or the court failed in its duty to maintain independence and impartiality and hence declared the author’s claims under article 14 (3) (e) as inadmissible due to non-substantiation. In conclusion, the communication was rendered inadmissible by the Committee.