

What are countries saying about Myanmar at the UN HRC?

Analysis and findings

56th Regular Session of the UN Human Rights Council

by the Centre for Civil and Political Rights

July 2024

[Background](#)

The Centre for Civil and Political Rights (CCPR Centre) has been monitoring discussions of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) on Myanmar and analysing statements made by countries. In order to provide stakeholders with practical and useful information for their advocacy, CCPR Centre has started an extensive collection and analysis of such statements and visualisation of the findings since the 29th Special Session of the HRC immediately after the military coup in February 2021. It highlights, among others: which countries are more vocal in addressing the crisis in Myanmar in support of its people, which are not and which countries appear to be blocking effective actions from the international community; what issues are raised and actions called for; and where advocacy should be strengthened.

This summary paper presents the results and findings of the analysis of statements made by countries at the 56th regular session of the HRC. More details about the entire project, including the visualisation products as well as the findings of the monitoring of previous HRC sessions since the military coup can be found [here](#).

HRC 56 - facts

- *The 56th Regular Session of the HRC took place from 18th June to 12th July 2024.*
- ***Two Interactive Dialogues (ID)** were held on Myanmar: the **ID with the High Commissioner (ID HC)** on 18th June and the **ID with the Special Rapporteur on Myanmar (ID SR)** on 4th July 2024.*
- *During these two IDs in total, **61** statements were made by countries and **9** by groups of countries:*
 - *During the ID HC, **32** countries¹ and **5** groups of countries² made statements.*
 - *During the ID SR, **29** countries³ and **4** groups of countries⁴ made statements.*

Methodology update

- *Statements were analysed using their texts uploaded on the HRC extranet. Texts uploaded in languages other than English⁵ were analysed by using an online translation tool. Furthermore, statements of following countries were analysed by transcribing their statements from the English channel of the UN Webcast as their texts were not available on the HRC extranet at the time of analysis.*
 - *ID HC: China, Lao PDR, Türkiye, United Kingdom*
 - *ID SR: Bulgaria, China, EU, France, Indonesia, Lao PDR, OIC, Russian Federation, Türkiye, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela*

¹ Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Viet Nam

² Benelux (presented by Luxembourg), CANZ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand, presented by Australia), European Union (EU), Nordic-Baltic Countries (NB8, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, presented by Denmark), and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, presented by Pakistan)

³ Albania, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, France, Gambia, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Türkiye, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela

⁴ European Union (EU), Group of Friends on Children and Armed Conflict (GoF CAAC, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Italy, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Uruguay, presented by Belgium), NB8 (presented by Norway), and OIC (presented by Pakistan)

⁵ ID HC: Belarus, Egypt, France, Kuwait, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Venezuela; ID SR: Albania, Belarus, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Mauritania

1. Key Highlights

- **Ghana** participated in the HRC discussion on Myanmar for the **1st time**, by presenting statements in both IDs.
- **Slovenia** participated in the HRC discussion on Myanmar for the **1st time since the 29 Special Session**, by presenting a statement during ID SR.
- **Cyprus** participated in the HRC discussion on Myanmar for the **2nd time** since the HRC 55, by presenting a statement during the ID SR.
- During ID HC, **majority** of countries **thanked** or **appreciated** the **report of the HC**, while:
 - **Indonesia, Kuwait and Malaysia** expressed **concern** about the situation reported by the HC;
 - **Saudi Arabia read with interest**;
 - **Egypt, India and Viet Nam took note**;
 - **China, Lao PDR, Russian Federation and Venezuela** made **no reference** to it; and
 - **Belarus** alleged that *“information provided by the Myanmar authorities” “was not duly taken into account in the report”* and the real situation was therefore *“distorted”*, and even **questioned** *“the objectivity and impartiality of the authors of the report.”*
 - Furthermore, **Belarus, China, Russia and Viet Nam** appeared to **undermine** or **oppose** international efforts to address the situation in Myanmar, or even to defend acts of Myanmar military i.e. the junta e.g.:
 - **Belarus** accused continued politicisation of the HRC mandate; regarded it “unacceptable” that “Myanmar is deprived of the voice” while pressure was exerted on it through unilateral mechanisms; demanded that “the position of Myanmar” should be taken into account; called on others to “contribute” “to the Government’s efforts to normalise the situation” and stop pressuring and interfering into the affairs of sovereign countries;
 - **China** asserted that only by upholding basic principles of international relations, such as sovereign equality and non-interference into the internal affairs could solve problems, protect and promote human rights;
 - **Russian Federation** alleged that a serious factor in the degradation of the situation in Myanmar was political, diplomatic and financial support of the anti-government forces by the "collective West"; opposed the use of multilateral platforms including HRC to pressure Naypyitaw; condemned attempts by Western countries to politicise Myanmar issue; and called for settlement of the crisis without interfering into internal affairs; and
 - **Viet Nam** stressed the need to ensure fundamental principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of the country and respect for its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity.
- During ID SR, **majority** of countries **thanked** or **welcomed** the **report of the SR**, while:
 - **Bangladesh, Ghana, Mauritania and Thailand took note**;
 - **Kuwait, Indonesia and Venezuela** made **no specific reference** to the SR’s report;

- **Belarus, China and Russian Federation** expressed their **opposition or disagreement** with the report;
 - **Belarus** alleged the **politicisation and abuse of the HRC mandate** on Myanmar and **bias on the part of the mandate holder**;
 - **China** expressed its **firm opposition** to the SR's Conference Room Paper, saying it **unjustifiably accused sovereign States' normal arms trade**; and
 - **Russian Federation** expressed the view that the **SR was groundlessly criticising Myanmar authorities**.
- Furthermore, **Belarus, China, Lao PDR, Russian Federation and Venezuela** appeared to **undermine** or **oppose** international efforts to address the situation in Myanmar, or even to defend acts of Myanmar military i.e. the junta e.g.:
 - **Belarus** asserted that "Myanmar Government" was regularly informing on the situation and confirming its readiness to conduct a constructive dialogue on human rights, that pressure was exerted on Myanmar while Myanmar side did not have a voice, and called on all others to contribute to the efforts of the "Government" to normalise the situation.
 - **China** alleged that the Government of Myanmar took positive measures to promote and protect human rights, stressed on the basic norms of international relations i.e. sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs, and accused the SR of smearing and double standard.
 - **Lao PDR** commended "*Myanmar for its constructive cooperation and engagement with the SE of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar and the ACHA Center as well as UN agencies for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people in need without discrimination*" and welcomed the commitment of "Myanmar" to hold general election in 2025.
 - **Russian Federation** condemned the practice of States using multilateral fora, HRC in particular, to pressure Naypyitaw and driving confrontation in the country, and called to establish "dialogue" without interfering in internal affairs.
 - **Venezuela** criticised the SR being politicised, unnecessary and ineffective, called for eradication of the SR as it violated peoples' right to self-determination and the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.
- Although Myanmar **military's access to arms, fuels** and other **resources** was one of the key issues raised by HC and SR, **only five countries** addressed it at HRC 56:
 - **US** was the only country addressing it during the ID HC by calling on the international community to do more to impede military's access to arms and financial resources.
 - During the ID SR: **Canada** echoed the SR's call to restrict junta's access to revenue and jet fuel; **Gambia** called on the international community to intensify efforts against arms sales and illicit financial flows; **Japan** expressed concern over procurement of weapons by Myanmar military; **UK** expressed its support for arms embargo and stressed that "*No State should be transferring weapons or dual use items to the Myanmar military*"; and the **US** urged the Security Council to take actions to cut off military's access to jet fuel.

- The issue of **conscription** was addressed by **Japan**, while **Ireland** and the **US** addressed it in the context of issues faced by Rohingyas during ID HC. It was addressed by **Gambia** and **Italy**, while **France** raised the issue of forced conscription of Rohingyas, during ID SR.
- **Spain** and **Switzerland** were the only countries addressing **forced recruitment** during the ID HC. **Bulgaria**, **Canada**, **Slovenia**, **Türkiye** and **UK** raised the issue during ID SR, whereby **Albania** and **Kuwait** addressed the forced recruitment of Rohingyas and them being used as human shields, and **South Africa** addressed the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities.
- Some countries were using **vague or problematic terms** when seemingly addressing Myanmar military (see chapter 6 for more detail), such as “**Myanmar**,” “**Myanmar authorities**” or “**authorities in Myanmar**,” “**Naypyidaw**,” “**Government**” or “**Myanmar Government**,” thereby failing to spell out the accountability of the Myanmar military / junta, blurring the target of their calls for actions, or appearing to give recognition or authority to the junta.
- While some calls were made to “all parties” or “stakeholders”, following countries **failed to specifically mention** or **address myanmar military** at all in their statement:
 - ID HC: **Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Türkiye, UK, Venezuela** and **Viet Nam**;
 - ID SR: **Bangladesh, China, Gambia, Kuwait, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malawi, Malaysia, Slovenia, Russia** and **Türkiye**
- As was the case at the HRC 55, **Luxembourg** was the only country at HRC 56 that made reference to the **NUG** (ID SR), apart from the Benelux (ID HC).
- **Gambia** was the only country addressing human rights abuses committed by Ethnic Armed Organisations (**EAOs**) against Rohingyas and other vulnerable groups (ID HC).
- **Bangladesh** (ID HC and SR) was the only country raising the issue of **cross-border shooting** and loss of lives and properties in Bangladesh territory.
- Only **China** (ID HC) called for “**early repatriation**” of Rohingyas, while **Kuwait** (ID SR) urged “Myanmar” to begin **Rohingya repatriation without specifying any conditions**.
- **India** (ID HC) and **Indonesia** (ID HC and SR) addressed the issue of **transnational crimes** including drug and human trafficking and human smuggling.
- **Indonesia** (ID SR) was the only country calling for **non-refoulement** of Rohingya refugees.
- **UK** (ID SR) was the only country calling for provision of **support to local CSOs**.
- **US** (ID SR) was the only country condemning the regime’s **transnational repression of citizens living abroad** to the arbitrary cancelling of passports, harassment and threats.

Did you know? After the HRC 56, 41 African States (out of 54), 28 Asia-Pacific States (out of 54⁶), 7 Eastern European States (out of 23), 27 Latin American and Caribbean States (out of 33), 4 Western

⁶ Excluding Myanmar

European and Other States (out of 28⁷) remain silent on Myanmar.⁸

2. Condemnations and Concerns

- The average degree of condemnations and concerns expressed at the HRC 56 was 0.2 and slightly decreased from the HRC 55, which recorded 0.24. The lowest ever recorded average was - 0.23 at HRC 54, and the highest being 1.34 recorded at the SS 29.
- At HRC 56, only 8 countries expressed **specific condemnations** over the acts of the junta: **Gambia** (ID HC); **Japan** (ID HC), **Switzerland** (ID HC), **Albania** (ID SR), **Canada** (ID SR), **Czech Republic** (ID SR), **Italy** (ID SR) and **United States** (ID SR).

“We strongly condemn the military’s systematic denial of the civilian population’s basic human rights.”
- Gambia, ID HC

- There was **no country** at HRC 56 expressing **specific concern** over the violation of international human rights and humanitarian law committed by the junta.
- Concerns over various issues were expressed in close to a half of the statements (27) made by countries at HRC 56 but without specifying Myanmar military’s accountability.⁹

“Ghana is deeply concerned about the tragic circumstance of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar.”
- Ghana, ID HC

- There were also 16 statements that did not express any concern or condemnation¹⁰.

3. Issues Raised

Overview of the issues raised and their frequency (from most to less frequent):

Violence and extrajudicial killing (29); Humanitarian situation (26); Rights of Rohingyas (26); Impunity and accountability (11); Women, children and other vulnerable groups (11); Arbitrary arrests and detentions (5); Repatriation (4); State of Emergency (1); Freedom of expression and assembly (1); ASEAN (1); Military coup (0); Elections (0);

⁷ Türkiye is included in the group of Asia-Pacific States

⁸ See UN regional groups of member states [here](#). Some of the countries were part of joint statements presented by regional bodies or groups of countries, but never presented individual statements. For details, please see [here](#).

⁹ ID HC: Bangladesh, Georgia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Kuwait, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Sierra Leone, Thailand, Türkiye, US; ID SR: Bangladesh, Bulgaria, France, Gambia, Indonesia, Japan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Mauritania, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Türkiye

¹⁰ ID HC: Austria, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Iran, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, UK; ID SR: Ghana, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Malawi, Slovenia, Thailand, UK,

- **'Violence and extrajudicial killings'** was the **most frequently** addressed issue at HRC 56, with a slight **increase** from HRC 55 (29 from 26).
- **'Humanitarian situation'** (26) and **'Rights of Rohingyas'** (26) were two other issues **frequently** addressed at HRC 55, both were also frequently addressed at the previous HRC 55 (28 and 25 respectively).
- Statements addressing **'women, children and other vulnerable groups'** **slightly increased** from HRC 55 (11 from 10).
- Statements addressing following issues **slightly decreased** at HRC 56 as compared to HRC 55 **'impunity and accountability'** (11 from 12), **'arbitrary arrests and detentions'** (5 from 6), **'repatriation'** of Rohingyas (4 from 5), and **'State of emergency'** (1 from 2).
- Statements addressing **'Freedom of expression and assembly'** **decreased** at HRC 56 as compared to HRC 55 (1 from 6).
- Statements addressing **'ASEAN'** (1 from 15) and **'Military coup'** (0 from 14) **significantly decreased** at HRC 56 as compared to HRC 55.

Did you know? As was the case at HRC 55, the issue of 'elections' was not addressed at all by any country at the HRC 56.

4. Call for Actions

Overview of number of calls for action by region and countries¹¹

African States (29 calls by 7 countries):

Gambia (7), Ghana (7), Malawi (6), Sierra Leone (3), South Africa (3), Mauritania (2), Egypt (1)

Asia-Pacific States (39 calls by 13 countries):

Viet Nam (5), India (4), Indonesia (4), Maldives (4), Türkiye (4), Kuwait (3), Malaysia (3), Republic of Korea (3), Bangladesh (2), Japan (2), Lao PDR (2), Saudi Arabia (2), Iran (1), China (0), Cyprus (0), Thailand (0)

Latin American and Caribbean States (1 call by 1 country):

Venezuela (1)

Eastern European States (13 calls by 5 countries):

Bulgaria (4), Czechia (3), Georgia (3), Slovenia (2), Albania (1), Belarus (0), Russia (0)

Western European and other States (37 calls by 10 countries):

Malta (6), US (6), France (4), Italy (4), UK (4), Austria (3), Canada (3), Spain (3), Switzerland (3), Ireland (1), Liechtenstein (0), Luxembourg (0)

¹¹ See UN regional groups of member states [here](#).

- In **total, 119 calls** for actions were made by 36 countries at the HRC 55¹², presenting an **increase** from HRC 55, which recorded 111 calls by 36 countries.
- The **highest number of calls** for action came from **Gambia** and **Ghana** (both 7), followed by **Malawi, Malta** and **US** (6 each), and **Viet Nam** (5).
- In terms of regions, most calls came from **Asia-Pacific** (39), followed by **WEOG** (37) and **Africa** (29). As compared to HRC 55, calls from Africa have significantly increased (from 14), while those from Asia Pacific saw a slight increase (from 37) and those from WEOG significantly decreased (from 50).
- The average number of calls per country per region among those who made calls for action at HRC 56 were, from the highest to the lowest: Africa (4.14), WEOG (3.7), Asia-Pacific (3), Eastern European (2.6) and Latin American and Caribbean (1).
- The % of countries that made calls for action per region were, from the highest to the lowest: WEOG (36%, 10 out of 28), Asia-Pacific (24%, 13 out of 54), Eastern European (22%, 5 out of 23), Africa (13%, 7 out of 54), and Latin American and Caribbean (3%, 1 out of 33).
- The average number of calls per country in general, including countries that did not make any statements and that made statement but did not make any calls, were from the highest to the lowest: WEOG (1.32), Asia-Pacific (0.72), Eastern European (0.57), Africa (0.54) and Latin American and Caribbean (0.03).

Did you know? Although they participated in the discussion on Myanmar, Belarus, China, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Russian Federation and Thailand did not make any concrete call for actions at HRC 56.

5. Which Actions?

Overview of actions called for and their frequency (from most to less frequent):

Stop violence (24); Unhindered humanitarian assistance (21); General call for peace, democracy, rule of law, and human rights (18); Protect rights of the Rohingyas (14); Realise accountability (13); IDPs and Refugees (7); Arms embargo (5); Stop persecution (5); Provide humanitarian assistance (4); Implement ASEAN initiatives (4); Other economic measures (2); Reinstatement of civilian government (2); Sanctions (0); End state of emergency (0); Stop death penalty/ execution (0); Recognise NUG (0); Access to information (0 from 0)

- As compared to the numbers at HRC 55, calls for following actions have **increased**:
 - **'Stop violence'** (24 from 13)
 - **'Unhindered humanitarian assistance'** (21 from 16)
 - **'Realise accountability'** (13 from 10)

¹² A phrase in statements that clearly calls for a concrete action is recorded as one "call". As such, one statement may include several calls for action, and vice versa, some statements might not include any.

- 'IDPs and Refugees' (7 from 5)
- 'Arms embargo' (5 from 3)
- As compared to the numbers at HRC 55, calls for following actions have **decreased**:
 - 'General call for peace, democracy, rule of law, and human rights' (18 from 23)
 - 'Stop persecution' (5 from 7)
 - 'Provide humanitarian assistance' (4 from 7)
 - 'Implement ASEAN initiatives' (4 from 5)
 - 'Reinstate civilian government' (2 from 5)
 - 'End state of emergency' (0 from 1)
- There were the **same number** of calls for 'Protect rights of the Rohingyas' (14) and 'Other economic measures' (2) at HRC 56 as compared to HRC 55.
- As was the case at the HRC 55, there were no calls for 'Sanctions', 'Stop death penalty / execution', 'Recognise NUG' and 'Access to information'.
- In addition to the **US** (2 calls during each ID) and **Canada** (ID HC), which also made calls for arms embargo at HRC 55, **Gambia** (ID SR) and **UK** (ID SR) also called for **arms embargo** at HRC 56.
- **Canada** (ID SR) and **Gambia** (ID SR) also called for other measures targeting **military's access to revenue**.

"we call upon the international community to ... reinforce efforts against arms sales and illicit financial flows"
 - Gambia, ID SR

6. Terms used to address "Myanmar"

- Some countries were using **vague or problematic terms** when seemingly addressing Myanmar military, thereby failing to spell out the accountability of the junta, blurring the target of their calls for actions, or appearing to give some recognition or legitimacy to the junta. Some countries also appeared to intentionally avoid mentioning Myanmar military in their statement or use vague terms.¹³
- **"Myanmar"**: **Belarus** (ID HC), **Indonesia** (ID HC), **Kuwait** (ID SR), **Lao PDR** (ID SR), **Malta** (ID HC) and **Sierra Leone** (ID HC) used the term *"Myanmar"*, from the context most likely referring to the Myanmar military / junta / SAC. Concerning the issue of the representation of the country concerned, using this term blurred the target of their statement / call and, in some cases, even gave the impression that they regard the junta as an actor representing Myanmar.

"We call on Myanmar to cooperate fully with the IIM, allow unhindered access to investigate allegations and hold perpetrators accountable before impartial and independent courts."
 - Malta, ID HC

¹³ See chapter 1 for the list of countries that failed to mention the Myanmar military in their statement.

“Lao PDR welcomes Myanmar commitment to hold general election in 2025.”

- Lao PDR, ID SR

- **“Myanmar authorities”, “authorities in Myanmar”**: **Belarus** (ID HC), **Gambia** (ID SR), **Ghana** (ID HC), **Iran** (ID HC), **Malaysia** (ID SR), **Mauritania** (ID SR) and **Russian Federation** (ID HC and ID SR) used these terms. From the context, most cases seem to be referring to the Myanmar military / junta / SAC, and by doing so, blurring the accountability of the Myanmar military for their actions and/or giving the impression that they regard the junta as the authorities in Myanmar. In some cases, the target of their statement / call was not absolutely clear.

“we urge the Myanmar authorities to respect the ICJ Provisional measures, cooperate fully with the Special Rapporteur and other UN mechanisms, allow unfettered access to all regions of the country to independently assess the human rights situation, and ensure the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of all displaced persons, including the Rohingya.”

- Gambia, ID SR

“we expect the authorities in Myanmar to ensure the political, security, humanitarian and human rights of Rohingya Minority”

- Iran, ID HC

- **“Nay Pyi Taw”**: **Russian Federation** used this term in both IDs clearly referring to the junta and appearing to “defend” it. Russian Federation has been continuously using this term.

“we oppose the use of multilateral platforms, including the Human Rights Council, to exert pressure on Nay Pyi Taw and condemn attempts by Western countries to politicize the Myanmar dossier.”

- Russian Federation, IDs HC

- **“Myanmar government”, “government”**: **Belarus** (ID HC and ID SR), **China** (ID SR), **Egypt** (ID HC) and **Sierra Leone** (ID HC) used these terms clearly referring to the junta and appearing to regard the junta as the “government” of Myanmar. Furthermore, Belarus and China even appeared to support or defend Myanmar military.

“The Myanmar Government regularly informs on the situation in the country, confirming its interest and readiness to conduct a constructive dialogue on human rights issues, but this information is not taken into account by the country's Special Rapporteur, who continues to take a biased position.”

- Belarus, ID SR

“Egypt calls on the Government of Myanmar to put an end to these violations by taking measures to provide them with the necessary protection and find a lasting solution to the crisis.”

- Egypt, ID HC

7. Regional bodies and groups of States

The **EU** has been **vocal and consistent** in addressing various issues by presenting statements at every session of the HRC since the 29th Special Session. At the HRC 56, statements of the EU expressed **specific condemnations and concerns** during both IDs, addressing issues of: accountability (ID HC), rights of Rohingyas (ID HC and ID SR), atrocity including war crimes (ID SR); and called for actions to: stop violence (ID HC and ID SR), unblock humanitarian aid (ID HC and ID SR), realise accountability (ID HC and ID SR), strengthen UN system (ID HC), **arms embargo** including the flow of dual usable items and aviation fuels as well as funds to the military (ID SR), release of arbitrarily detained (ID SR). Furthermore, EU addressed the issue of forced conscription of Rohingyas (ID HC) and also *“illegal conscription including of women and use of Rohingya as human shields by the Myanmar military in particular and by other armed actors”* (ID SR).

OIC has been **vocal** at each session of the HRC, except for the 29th Special Session, however, their statements have been **largely focused on matters related to Rohingyas**. At HRC 56, OIC presented statements at both IDs (presented by Pakistan), thanking both HC and SR. It addressed *“resumption of hostilities in Rakhine State and ... violence, forced displacement and property destruction against the Rohingya Muslims”* (ID HC and ID SR) as well as *“forced recruitment and use of Rohingya as human shield by the warring parties in Rakhine”* (ID SR). The degree of condemnation by OIC has remained vague merely expressing **general concern**. Both OIC’s statements failed to **mention anything about the Myanmar military** and its calls for action were all addressed to **“Myanmar”**, which included unblocking of humanitarian aid (ID HC), protection of Rohingyas (ID HC and ID SR), as well as accountability (ID HC and ID SR).

Nordic-Baltic Countries (NB8) have been **consistent** in addressing the crisis in Myanmar, presenting statements at each HRC session since the HRC 46. At the HRC 56, NB8 presented statements during IDs (ID HC by Denmark and ID SR by Norway). Their degree of condemnation was rather weak at HRC 56 as compared to previous sessions, merely expressing **general concern**. It addressed: *“military attacks causing civilian fatalities, including women, children and persons belonging to ethnic minorities”* (ID HC) as well as violence against women and children, forced recruitment, humanitarian situation and safety of civilians and children in IDP camps (ID SR). However, during ID HC, its call for action was addressed to **“Myanmar”**, while it failed to mention Myanmar military and make any clear call for action during ID SR.

CANZ (Australia, Canada and New Zealand) as a group participated in the discussion on Myanmar for the **third time** through a statement presented by Australia during the ID HC. CANZ’s statement at HRC 56 expressed general concern and addressed attacks against civilians including Rohingyas, hampered humanitarian access and displacement of people. It also addressed the enforcement of the 2010 conscription law as well as *“forcible recruitment of children by the regime.”* It called on all States to impose **arms embargo** including dual-use materials and aviation fuel.

Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) has participated in the discussion on Myanmar for the **fourth time** through a statement presented by Luxembourg during ID HC at HRC 56. Although it addressed violence against civilians, suffering of Rohingyas including through enforcement of

conscription law, and the situation of children, their statement failed to express any concern over the situation. As the only group of countries, it referred to **NUG** by welcoming its efforts. However, it failed to make any reference to the Myanmar military and did not make any specific call for actions.

Group of Friends on Children and Armed Conflict (GoF CAAC), a group of 27 countries, participated in the HRC discussion on Myanmar for the **second time** since HRC 53, through a statement presented by Belgium during ID SR. While Chile was not a part of the GoF CAAC at HRC 56 (it was at HRC 53), Jordan joined the group at HRC 56 (it was not at HRC 53). GoF CAAC's statement largely focused on the situation of children and did not make any reference to the SR's report or CRPs, while calling on Myanmar armed forces to stop violence against children, release detained children, unblock humanitarian access and *"to re-engage with the UN for the full implementation of the 2012 joint action plan to end the recruitment and use of children"*.