

What are countries saying about Myanmar at the UN HRC?

Analysis and findings

54th Regular Session of the UN Human Rights Council

*by the Centre for Civil and Political Rights
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Background

The Centre for Civil and Political Rights (CCPR Centre) has been monitoring discussions of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) on Myanmar and analysing statements made by countries. In order to provide stakeholders with practical and useful information for their advocacy, CCPR Centre has started an extensive collection and analysis of such statements and visualisation of the findings since the 29th Special Session of the HRC immediately after the military coup in February 2021. It highlights, among others: which countries are more vocal in addressing the crisis in Myanmar in support of its people, which are not and which countries appear to be blocking effective actions from the international community; what issues are raised and actions called for; and where advocacy should be strengthened.

This summary paper presents the results and findings of the analysis of statements made by countries at the 54th regular session of the HRC. More details about the entire project, including the visualisation products as well as the findings of the monitoring of previous HRC sessions since the illegal military coup can be found [here](#).

HRC 54 - key facts

- The 54rd Regular Session of the HRC took place from 11th September to 13th October 2023.
- **Two Interactive Dialogues (ID)** were held on Myanmar: one on 11th September with the **Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (ID IIMM)** on its report, the other one on 26th September **with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (ID HC)** on his report on human rights situation in Myanmar.
- In total, **53** statements were made by countries and **10** by groups of countries at the HRC 54:
 - During the ID IIMM, **29** countries¹ and **3** groups of countries² made statements.
 - During the ID HC, **24** countries³ and **3** groups of countries⁴ made statements.

Methodology update

- Statements were analysed using their texts uploaded on the HRC extranet. Texts uploaded in languages other than English⁵ were analysed by using an online translation tool. Furthermore, statements of following countries were analysed by transcribing their statements from the English channel of the UN Webcast as their texts were not available on the HRC extranet at the time of analysis.
 - ID IIMM: Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, China, France, Malta, Türkiye, United States
 - ID HC: Bangladesh, China, Gambia, Germany, Indonesia, Maldives, Türkiye

¹ Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, France, Gambia, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Netherlands, Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Switzerland, Türkiye, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela

² European Union (EU), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, presented by Pakistan), and Nordic-Baltic Countries (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, presented by Finland)

³ Bangladesh, China, Czech Republic, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Libya, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Maldives, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Türkiye, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela

⁴ European Union (EU), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, presented by Pakistan), and CANZ (Canada, Australia and New Zealand, presented by Australia)

⁵ ID IIMM: Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Egypt, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Russian Federation, Switzerland, Venezuela; ID HC: France, Kuwait, Libya, Luxembourg, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Venezuela

1. Key Highlights

- **Majority of statements welcomed**, appreciated or concurred with reports submitted by the IIMM and HC, while:
 - **Saudi Arabia** “*reviewed with interest*” the HC’s report
 - **Egypt** and **Mauritania** *took note* of the IIMM’s report, while **Bangladesh, Libya** and **OIC** took note of the HC’s report;
 - **France** and **Venezuela** did not make any reference to HC’s report;
 - **Iran** did not make any reference to IIMM’s report; and
 - **China, Indonesia** and **Russia** made no reference to either reports.
- Furthermore, following countries appeared to **oppose or undermine the reports of IIMM and/or HC**:
 - **Belarus** said IIMM’s mandates were politicised, but welcomed “*efforts by the Myanmar government to preserve cooperations with UN agencies and countries in the region*” and called for “*respect for sovereignty of Myanmar and support for government to normalise the situation and to refrain from putting pressure on the government*”;
 - **Venezuela** called IIMM’s report as “*questionable and unbalanced*” and its mandates were politically motivated. During ID HC Venezuela also said that duplication of reports and dialogues mandated by some countries were unnecessary and counterproductive and undermining respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs, and demanded an end to unilaterally coerced measures on Myanmar;
 - **China** during the ID HC claimed politicisation of human rights and stressed on the non-interference in the internal affairs would have solved the problem;
 - **Russia** during the ID HC claimed that a number of States were using the HRC to pressure Myanmar under human rights pretexts, expressing its consistent opposition towards political initiatives at the HRC based on selectivity and double-standards.
 - **Iran** during ID IIMM said that the issue demands the attention of the HRC, “while upholding the principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs of Myanmar”, and that “*the immediate removal of sanctions on this country*” is a prerequisite for solution;
 - **Lao PDR** during ID HC also said that “*human rights issues shall be addressed ... with respect for sovereignty and independence of states.*”
- Facilitating **accountability** is the main work of the IIMM and it is also one of the key issues HC put a particular focus in his work and reporting:
 - A number of statements addressed the issue of accountability **during ID IIMM**, whereby:
 - **Bulgaria, Canada, Luxembourg, South Africa, UK, US** and **EU** clearly addressed the issue of accountability, especially that of the Myanmar military;
 - **Costa Rica, Gambia, Malaysia, Romania, Switzerland** and **Nordic-Baltic countries** addressed the issue of accountability in general, not specifically that of the Myanmar military (although the military / junta was mentioned in their statements);

- **Malta, Mauritania and Netherlands** addressed the issue of accountability in general, but did not mention anything about the Myanmar military in their statements;
 - **Australia, Belgium and France** indirectly or vaguely touched upon the issue of accountability;
 - **Liechtenstein** indirectly or vaguely touched upon the issue of accountability but did not mention anything about the Myanmar military in their statements;
 - **Bangladesh, Egypt, Türkiye** and **OIC** focused on the accountability for Rohingyas, but did not mention anything about the Myanmar military in their statements;
 - **Belarus, China, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Russia** and **Venezuela** did not touch upon the issue of accountability at all; and
 - **Belarus, China, Indonesia, Iran, Russia** and **Venezuela** did not mention anything about the Myanmar military in their statements.
- Several statements addressed the issue of accountability **during ID HC**, whereby:
 - Clear calls for accountability was made by **Czech Republic**, while **Gambia, Italy, UK, US** and **EU** addressed the issue more in general;
 - **Luxembourg** indirectly or vaguely touched upon the issue of accountability i.e. impunity;
 - **Libya, Maldives** and **OIC** focused on the accountability for Rohingyas, but did not mention anything about the Myanmar military in their statements;
 - **Bangladesh, China, France, Georgia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Spain, Thailand, Türkiye, Venezuela** and **CANZ** did not address the issue of accountability or impunity in their statements;
 - **Malaysia** and **Türkiye** mentioned the Myanmar military, i.e. concerning the lack of ASEAN 5PC implementation and the coup respectively, but did not address anything about atrocities or human rights violations committed by the military in their statements;
 - **Bangladesh, China, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand** and **Venezuela** did not mention anything about the Myanmar military in their statements.
- Some countries were using **vague or problematic terms**⁶ when seemingly addressing Myanmar military, such as “Myanmar,” “*de facto authorities of Myanmar*,” “*Myanmar authorities*” or “*authorities in Myanmar*,” “*Myanmar government*,” “authorities in Naypyitaw,” “*military authorities*,” thereby failing to spell out the accountability of the Myanmar military / junta, blurring the target of their calls for actions, or appearing to give some recognition or legitimacy to the military.
- The number and degree of **condemnations and concerns** expressed at the HRC 54 was the **lowest** since February 2021.

⁶ For more details, please see chapter 6.

- Using the vague term “**Myanmar**”, when seemingly addressing Myanmar military, **Lao PDR** was the only country that **even commended** its commitment towards Rakhine saying “*We commend Myanmar’s commitment to ensure safety and security for all communities in Rakhine state, including its cooperation with Bangladesh on repatriation of displaced persons.*”
- Australia, Canada and New Zealand presented a statement on Myanmar as a bloc “CANZ” for the first time during ID HC.
- Russia was the only one who referred to the National Unity Government (NUG) in their statements at HRC 54 (ID IIMM), however portraying it as rather the perpetrator of problems.

Did you know? After the HRC 54, 42 African States (out of 54), 29 Asia-Pacific States (out of 54⁷), 7 Eastern European States (out of 23), 27 Latin American and Caribbean States (out of 33), 4 Western European and Other States (out of 28⁸) still remain silent on Myanmar.⁹

2. Condemnations and Concerns

- The number and degree of condemnations and concerns expressed at the HRC 54 was the lowest since February 2021 (43% or 23 out of 53 total country statements) following the HRC 53 as the second lowest, a trend of significant decrease can be observed in 2023.
- Only 5 countries, Australia (ID IIMM), Czech Republic (ID HC), France (ID IIMM), Italy (ID HC), and the UK (ID HC), expressed specific condemnations over the military coup (France); the junta’s brutal attacks including bombings, arson and airstrikes on civilians (Australia and UK); and violation of the international human rights law (Czech Republic and Italy).

“We condemn the military’s increasingly brutal tactics, including the targeting of civilians through airstrikes and the burning of homes.”
- *United Kingdom, ID HC*

- The US was the only country that expressed specific concern over the atrocities and abuses committed by the Myanmar military with absolute impunity (ID HC).

“We remain deeply concerned about the worsening human rights situation in Myanmar, where the military continues to commit atrocities and numerous other serious abuses of human rights across the country, with absolute impunity.”
- *United States, ID HC*

- Statements of Belarus (ID IIMM), China (ID IIMM and ID HC), Iran (ID IIMM), Russian Federation (ID IIMM and ID HC) and Venezuela (ID IIMM and ID HC) appeared to defend, support or

⁷ Excluding Myanmar

⁸ Türkiye is included in the group of Asia-Pacific States

⁹ See UN regional groups of member states [here](#). Some of the countries were part of joint statements presented by regional bodies or groups of countries, but never presented individual statements. For details, please see [here](#).

legitimise actions of Myanmar military, typically claiming the politicisation of the UN mandates (e.g. HRC, HC and IIMM) and/or stressing on national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the “internal affairs” of Myanmar.

Did you know? Among 53 statements made by countries at the HRC 54, only 6 expressed specific condemnations and concerns clearly identifying the Myanmar military as perpetrator of human rights violations and atrocities against civilians. The number was even less than the number of statements that appeared to defend, support or legitimise actions of the Myanmar military (8).

3. Issues Raised

Overview of the issues raised and their frequency (from most to less frequent):

Violence and extrajudicial killing (26); Rights of the Rohingyas (24); Impunity and accountability (22); Women, children and other vulnerable groups (13); Humanitarian situation (12); Military coup (7); ASEAN (7); Repatriation (7); Arbitrary arrests and detentions (3); Freedom of expression and assembly (0); Elections (0); State of Emergency (0)

- ‘Violence and extrajudicial killing’ was the most frequent issue mentioned (26), mainly regarding the military attacks on civilians.
- ‘Rights of the Rohingyas’ was mentioned 24 times addressing, among others, systemic atrocities against the Rohingyas, lack of access to humanitarian assistance and livelihoods, and the need to create an environment for safe, voluntary, sustainable and dignified repatriation.
- ‘Impunity and accountability’ was mentioned 22 times regarding, among others, the work of IIMM and war crimes along with the crime against humanity committed by the junta.

“In a time when the quest for justice seems increasingly difficult and elusive, the work of the IIMM serves as a beacon of hope. It sends a powerful message that impunity will not be tolerated and that those who commit heinous acts will be held accountable.”

- Gambia, ID IIMM

- ‘Women, children and other vulnerable groups’ was mentioned 13 times followed by the issue of ‘humanitarian situation’ (12).
- Issues related to the ‘military coup’, ‘repatriation’ and ‘ASEAN’ were mentioned 7 times each.
- France and India were the only countries, apart from five ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Thailand) that mentioned issues related to ASEAN, mainly concerning the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus.
- ‘Arbitrary arrests and detentions’ was only mentioned by Spain, US, and Bulgaria.

Did you know? Similar to the HRC 53, issues of ‘freedom of expression and assembly,’ ‘elections’ and ‘state of emergency’ were not addressed at all by any country at the HRC 54.

4. Call for Actions

Overview of number of calls for action by region and countries¹⁰

African States:

Libya (2), Mauritania (2), Malawi (2), Egypt (1), South Africa (1), Gambia (0)

Asia-Pacific States:

Japan (5), Thailand (4), Türkiye (4), Malaysia (4), Bangladesh (3), Maldives (3), Lao PDR (2), Iran (2), Saudi Arabia (1), Kuwait (0), China (0), Indonesia (0), India (0)

Latin American and Caribbean States:

Costa Rica (1), Venezuela (0)

Eastern European States:

Czech Republic (5), Bulgaria (4), Georgia (2), Russian Federation (1), Romania (0), Belarus (0)

Western European and other States:

France (8), Italy (6), Germany (5), Luxembourg (5), Spain (5), Malta (3), Switzerland (3), United Kingdom (3), United States (3), Australia (1), Canada (1), Netherlands (1), Belgium (0), Liechtenstein (0)

- In total, 93 calls for actions were made by countries at the HRC 54¹¹, presenting a significant drop from previous sessions (e.g. HRC 53 recorded 143 calls).
- The highest number of calls for action came from France, which made 8 calls, followed by Italy (6), Germany (5), Luxembourg (5), Spain (5), Czech Republic (5), and Japan (5).
- Although their statements appeared to defend, support or legitimise actions of the Myanmar military in general, the Russian Federation called on “*all political forces*” to avoid escalation of violence during ID IIMM and Iran invited “*the authorities in Myanmar*” to implement the ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus and to protect rights of Rohingyas.

“It is necessary for all political forces in Myanmar to exercise restraint and avoid steps that lead to an escalation of violence and polarization of public sentiment.”

- Russian Federation, ID IIMM

Did you know? Belarus, Belgium, China, Gambia, Indonesia, Liechtenstein, Romania, Venezuela did not make any concrete call for actions during the HRC 54.

¹⁰ See UN regional groups of member states [here](#).

¹¹ A phrase in statements that clearly calls for a concrete action is recorded as one “call”. As such, one statement may include several calls for action, and vice versa, some statements might not include any. “Calls” that appear to defend, support or legitimise human rights violations including the acts of Myanmar military and that attempt to block actions to protect human rights of the people of Myanmar are not regarded as a call for action. More details about the methodology is available [here](#). Categories of actions identified can be found in section 5. For the overview of countries participating in the two IDs, please see footnotes 3 and 4 above.

5. Which Actions?

Overview of actions called for and their frequency (from most to less frequent):

Stop violence (15); Realise accountability (15); General call for peace, democracy, rule of law, and human rights (14); Protect rights of the Rohingyas (13); Stop persecution (10); Unblock humanitarian assistance (9); Reinstatement of civilian government (8); Implement ASEAN initiatives (4); Provide humanitarian assistance (2); Stop death penalty/ execution (2); Protect the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees (1); Impose arms embargo (0); End state of emergency (0); Impose other economic measures (0); Impose sanctions (0); Ensure access to information (0); Recognise NUG (0)

- Through the total of 93 calls, 11 different categories of actions were called for at HRC 54.
- Although the total number of calls for actions has significantly dropped from HRC 53 to HRC 54 (143 to 93), the number of calls for reinstating civilian government increased by 2 (6 to 8), and the number for ending persecution and for the halt of death penalty increased by 1 (9 to 10 and 1 to 2 respectively).
- The most called for actions were cessation of violence¹² and realisation of accountability (15 each). 15 calls for realising accountability were predominantly made during the ID IIMM (12) and much less during ID HC (3).
- 14 calls were made in a rather general manner, e.g. to stop human rights violations, engage in dialogues, and/or to respect international law.

“Switzerland encourages all parties to the conflict to cooperate with international mechanisms and engage in dialogue to find a political solution to this serious multidimensional crisis.”

- Switzerland, ID IIMM

- 13 calls were made to protect rights of Rohingyas, among which 5 included calls for safe, voluntary or dignified return of Rohingyas¹³.
- The number of calls for unblocking humanitarian assistance has significantly decreased at HRC 54 (9) from HRC 53, when it was the second most frequently called action (24).
- 9 calls were made for reinstating civilian government and restoring democracy, but none of them mentioned anything about election.

¹² None of the calls for stopping violence mentioned anti-personnel landmines at HRC 54, while it was addressed by Australia at HRC 53.

¹³ Bangladesh (ID HC) “voluntary”; Italy (ID HC) “safe and voluntary”; Maldives (ID HC) and Saudi Arabia (ID HC) “safe and dignified”; and Mauritania (ID IIMM) “safe and dignified” and “safe and voluntary”. However, Mauritania also called for “immediate” such return. Malaysia (ID HC) was the only one addressing third country resettlement of Rohingyas, while Bangladesh (ID HC) was the only one mentioning their re-integration.

- There were 4 calls for the implementation of or support of ASEAN-led initiatives, while only one of them was made by an ASEAN country¹⁴ and three were by non-ASEAN countries¹⁵.
- Only 2 calls were made for timely or increased provision of humanitarian assistance¹⁶ and for an end to the death penalty.¹⁷

“We urge the release (of) all those arbitrarily detained, the suspension of capital executions and the adoption of a moratorium of death penalty.”

- Italy, ID HC

- While sanctions were mentioned by France and the UK and the arms embargo only by the UK¹⁸, it was done in a way of presenting their own actions rather than calling on others to act.

“The UK also remains committed to targeting the regime’s access to finance and arms, which facilitate the most egregious crimes. Since the coup, we have announced targeted sanctions on the military leadership and its access to revenue and equipment.”

- United Kingdom, ID HC

Did you know? No calls for actions were made on: ‘arms embargo’, ‘state of emergency’, ‘imposition of sanctions’, ‘other economic measures’, ‘access to information’ and ‘recognition of NUG’ at HRC 54, two categories more than HRC 53 (‘arms embargo’ and ‘state of emergency’, which had 4 and 1 calls respectively at HRC 53).

6. Action by whom?

- Among the 93 calls for actions, 42 were made to specific actors, 32 to vague or generic actors, and 19 did not specify actors.
- Among 42 calls made to specific actors, majority was calling on the Myanmar military (33)¹⁹, while 5 were to (all) member States; one call each was made to the High Commissioner, the HRC, the OHCHR and ASEAN.
- Vague or generic actors addressed by 32 calls included: ‘regional countries’, ‘international community’, ‘all stakeholders’, ‘all political forces in Myanmar’, ‘all parties to the conflict’, ‘Myanmar’, and ‘the Myanmar government/ authorities/ de facto authorities’.
- Some countries were using vague or problematic terms when seemingly addressing Myanmar military, such as “Myanmar,” “de facto authorities of Myanmar,” “Myanmar authorities” or

¹⁴ Malaysia during ID HC

¹⁵ Germany during ID HC; Iran and Japan during ID IIMM

¹⁶ By Thailand (ID HC) and Türkiye (ID IIMM) respectively

¹⁷ By Italy and Spain, both during ID HC (also by EU during ID IIMM)

¹⁸ Also by EU

¹⁹ Including calls made to the junta and the military authorities

“authorities in Myanmar,” “Myanmar government,” “authorities in Naypyitaw,” “military authorities,” thereby failing to spell out the accountability of the Myanmar military / junta, blurring the target of their calls for actions, or appearing to give some recognition or legitimacy to the military:

- **“Myanmar”**: **Bangladesh, Venezuela** and **OIC** in both IDs, and **China** (ID IIMM), **Kuwait** (ID HC), **Lao PDR** (ID HC) and **Russian Federation** (ID HC) used *“Myanmar”*, from the context most likely referring to the Myanmar military / junta / SAC, whereby (possibly intentionally) blurring the accountability of the Myanmar military, making their call less effective and/or attempting to regard the junta as an actor representing Myanmar.

“We urge Myanmar to fully cooperate with IIMM ... Myanmar should fully cooperate with the Mechanism ... call upon Myanmar not to destroy any evidence.” (ID IIMM), “we are working with Myanmar to commence repatriation of the verified Rohingyas” (ID HC)
- Bangladesh

“OIC deeply regrets Myanmar’s persistent non-cooperation with the Mechanisms” (ID IIMM), “welcome continuous dialogue between Bangladesh and Myanmar ... OIC urges Myanmar to” (ID HC)
- OIC

- **“Myanmar authorities”, “authorities in Myanmar”**: **Bangladesh** (ID HC), **Iran** (ID IIMM), **Maldives** (ID HC), **Mauritania** (ID IIMM) and **Russia** (ID IIMM) used these terms, from the context most likely referring to the Myanmar military / junta / SAC, whereby (possibly intentionally) blurring the accountability of the Myanmar military and making their call less effective and even in some cases giving the impression as if they were recognising the military as the authorities in Myanmar. Similarly, **Romania** used the term **“authorities in Naypyidaw”** during the ID IIMM addressing the lack of their cooperation with the IIMM, while **Luxembourg** used **“de facto authorities in Myanmar”** (autorités de fait du Myanmar) when reiterating its calls for action during the ID IIMM.

“we invite the authorities in Myanmar to consider the following measures ...”
- Iran, ID IIMM

“reiterate our call to the Myanmar authorities to cooperate with international and regional judicial and accountability mechanisms ...”
- Maldives, ID HC

- **“Myanmar government”**: **Egypt** (ID IIMM), **Belarus** (ID IIMM), **Libya** (ID HC) and **Malta** (ID IIMM) used this term, from the context most likely referring to the Myanmar military / junta / SAC, making their calls quite ineffective, moreover, even giving the impression they regard the junta as the “government” of Myanmar.

“call upon the government of Myanmar to cooperate fully with the mechanism”
- Malta, ID IIMM

- **“Military authority”**: **Malaysia** (ID HC) and **Switzerland** (ID IIMM) used this term, from the context most likely referring to the Myanmar military / junta / SAC, making their calls quite ineffective and giving the impression as if they were recognising the military as the legitimate authorities in Myanmar.

“regrets the lack of substantial progress on its implementation by Myanmar’s military authorities. ... reiterate our call on the military authorities to immediately implement the ASEAN five-point consensus”

- Malaysia, ID HC

“the crisis that Myanmar has been experiencing since the military authorities took power. ... urges the Myanmar military authorities to fully and quickly implement Security Council resolution 2669 (2022).”

- Switzerland, ID IIMM

- During ID IIMM, **US** used **“Myanmar”**, **“Myanmar authority”** and **“Myanmar military”**, while **Malawi** used **“Myanmar”** and **“military in Myanmar”** in their statements.

“the failure by Myanmar to investigate or punish sexual and gender-based crimes ... We urge the military in Myanmar to take effective steps to ensure accountability”

- Malawi, ID IIMM

“The Myanmar authority’s refusal to cooperate ... All member states including Myanmar and its neighbours must cooperate ... The Myanmar military’s continued atrocities and its abuses and violations”

- US, ID IIMM

- During ID HC, **Czech Republic** used **“military authorities”** and **“the military”**, while **Spain** used **“military authorities”** and **“military junta”** in their statements.

“express our deep concern regarding the actions of the military in Myanmar ... The military junta ignores the international human rights law ... urge the military authorities in Myanmar to ...”

- Czech Republic, ID HC

“Military authorities continue to carry out indiscriminate airstrikes and ground operations against the civilian population ... demands that the military authorities immediately end the attacks ... calling on the military junta and other armed actors to stop violence and human rights violations.”

- Spain, ID HC

7. Regional bodies and groups of States

The following regional bodies and groups of States made statements at the HRC 54:

- During the ID IIMM: **European Union** (EU), **Organisation of Islamic Cooperation** (OIC, presented by Pakistan), and **Nordic-Baltic Countries** (presented by Finland)

- During the ID SR: **EU**, **OIC** (presented by Pakistan) and **CANZ** (Canada, Australia and New Zealand, presented by Australia)

The **EU** has been **vocal and consistent** in addressing various issues including **accountability** in Myanmar, presenting statements at every session of the HRC since the 29th Special Session. At the HRC 54, statements of the EU covered: coup; impunity and accountability; violence and extrajudicial killings; arbitrary arrest and detention; rights of Rohingyas; women, children and other vulnerable groups including refugees; humanitarian situation; and called for actions on: imposing sanctions against the military; stopping persecution; stopping violence; ensuring access to humanitarian assistance; protection of the rights of Rohingyas; death penalty; and on peace, democracy and human rights in general.

OIC has been **vocal** at each session of the HRC, except for the 29th Special Session, however, their statements **largely focused on matters related to Rohingyas**. At HRC 54, OIC welcomed the report of IIMM and commended the progress of IIMM's work, while only took note of the HC's report and reiterated its call for *"greater focus on the human rights situation of Rohingya Muslims."* The degree of **condemnation** by OIC concerning Myanmar military's acts has been rather **weak** and OIC's statements seem to **avoid mentioning anything about Myanmar military** (constantly using the term "Myanmar"), although calling for accountability for Rohingyas. Among regional bodies and groups of States,²⁰ OIC was the only one welcoming the **"pilot project"** saying *"welcome continuous dialogue between Bangladesh and Myanmar over the commencement of repatriation through a pilot project."*

Nordic-Baltic Countries have also been **consistent** in addressing the crisis in Myanmar, presenting statements at each HRC session since the HRC 46. At the HRC 54, they presented a statement during ID IIMM and called for an immediate end of **violence against civilians** and for **accountability**, although did not specify perpetrators. While some of their previous statements used the vague term *"Myanmar"*²¹ when calling for actions, the statement at the HRC 54 specifically referred to *"the junta"* urging them to cooperate with the IIMM, respect human rights, uphold the rule of law, and implement ASEAN's 5PC.

CANZ (Australia, Canada and New Zealand) as a group participated in the discussion for the **first time** during the ID HC at HRC 54 through a statement presented by Australia. They expressed grave concern over violence specifically addressing indiscriminate attacks, mass burning of villages, sexual and gender-based violence, torture and arbitrary detention, against civilians and called on the military regime for immediate end of violence, return to a democratic path, full and unhindered humanitarian access and implementation of ASEAN's 5PC.

²⁰ Among individual countries, China (ID IIMM), Bangladesh and Lao PDR (both ID HC) did so.

²¹ HRC 53 PD R and HRC 52 ID HC both presented by Norway; HRC 49 ID HC, HRC 48 ID HC, HRC 47 ID SR and HRC 46 ID SR all presented by Lithuania